News concerning the theft of a laptop from the office of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi during the Capitol building breach by supporters of then-President Trump has raised concerns about potential access to sensitive, potentially classified information. However, it appears these worries are unfounded—even assuming the device and others contained highly confidential data, which is improbable, it could almost certainly be deactivated remotely, similar to how corporations manage their assets.

The overall cybersecurity risk stemming from the riot is likely less significant than initially perceived, as we previously discussed. When considering stolen or compromised hardware specifically, several key points should be taken into account.

The offices of elected officials function, in many respects, as public areas. These historic buildings regularly host tours, meetings with international representatives and other political figures, and are typically populated by numerous government employees without security clearances working alongside one another. The primary focus of their work is largely legislative and administrative—generally public tasks, with the most confidential information likely consisting of unreleased speeches and preliminary legislative drafts.

Furthermore, it’s worth remembering that many of these individuals had recently been working remotely. While the joint session to certify the electoral votes undoubtedly brought a larger-than-usual number of people to the Capitol, this was far from a typical workday—even prior to the forceful occupation of the building by radicalized individuals. It’s probable that little critical work was being performed on the computers in these offices at the time.

In fact, Reuters reports that the laptop in question was a dedicated machine used in a conference room—an older Inspiron model used for presentations, rather than Speaker Pelosi’s personal computer or a direct connection to classified information.

Even if unauthorized access were a concern, the federal government, like any large organization, maintains a standard IT department with a contemporary system for managing devices. The laptop from Speaker Pelosi’s office, like all hardware used for official House and Senate business, is monitored by IT personnel and should be capable of being remotely disabled or its data wiped. The current challenge for the department lies in identifying which devices require such action—as previously reported, there was no pre-existing plan to address a violent takeover of the Capitol building.

Therefore, it is highly probable that the most significant consequence of the theft of government computers on January 6th will be inconvenience, or at best, some degree of embarrassment if informal communications are made public. Staff members routinely share opinions and concerns, both through official and unofficial channels.

Nevertheless, those who entered these offices and stole equipment—some of whom were recorded doing so—are currently being apprehended and charged. The fact that the theft does not represent a major security threat does not diminish its illegality.

Cybersecurity experts will confirm that the far greater threat is the extensive compromise of government contractors and accounts through the SolarWinds breach. These systems contain a wealth of information that was never intended for public release and will likely continue to fuel attacks targeting credentials for years to come.